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This year, the Loebner Prize competition1 was held in England, at the University of
Reading to be precise.2 It was paralleled by a Symposium on the Turing Test
(henceforth TT, Turing (1950)) organised by the Society for the Study of Artificial
Intelligence and Simulation of Behaviour (AISB). Expectations were high, and very
highly advertised too. Kevin Warwick, the organiser (together with Huma Shah),
seemed to believe that this might well be the time when machines would pass the
TT: ‘‘The competition is all about whether a machine can now pass the Turing Test,
a significant milestone in Artificial Intelligence. I believe machines are getting
extremely close––it would be tremendously exciting if such a world first occurred in
the UK, in Reading University in 2008. This is a real possibility’’.3 Having been
invited to play the role of judge, together with several colleagues, we were indeed
very excited but also very sceptical. We doubted that machines could pass even a
simplified TT. In any case, we enjoyed the opportunity to see close-up the
organisation and machinery of the TT. It was intriguing.
The test was organised as follows: four judges were each asked to sit in front of a
computer in order to interact with two interlocutors at the same time by means of a
chat system, very similar to the––by now well known––IM clients. Following
Turing’s suggestion, the interaction was limited to 5 min altogether (this meant an
average of 2.5 min dedicated to each interlocutor on the split screen), at the end of
which every judge was asked to declare whether one, both or neither of the
interlocutors were machines. This feature was a confusing departure from the
original Turing Test, which we discovered only because one of us (Matteo Turilli)
became convinced that both interlocutors were computers (he was right). The whole
process was then repeated by shifting every judge to a new station in order to make
them test a total of four pairs of interlocutors. Each time, the judge was asked to
score the machine capabilities between 0 and 100, or to guess the gender, age,
speaking abilities (e.g. native speaker) and potential linguistic impairments of the
human interlocutor.
As we had expected, and despite the brevity of our chats, a couple of questions
and answers were usually sufficient to confirm that the best machines are still not
even close to resembling anything that might be open-mindedly called vaguely
intelligent. Here are some convincing examples.
One of us (Luciano Floridi) started his chat by asking: ‘‘if we shake hands, whose
hand am I holding?’’ One interlocutor, the human, immediately answered, meta-
linguistically, that the conversation should not have mentioned bodily interactions.
Indeed, he later turned out to be Andrew Hodges, Turing biographer (Hodges 1983),
who had been recruited on the spot in order to interact with one of us (LF) on the
other side of the screen. On the other hand, the computer, which turned out to be
‘‘jabberwacky’’,4 failed to address the question and spoke about something else, a
trick used by many of the tested machines: ‘‘We live in eternity. So, yeah, no. We
1 http://www.loebner.net/Prizef/loebner-prize.html retrieved 12 November 2008.
2 http://www.reading.ac.uk/cirg/loebner/cirg-loebner-main.asp retrieved 12 November 2008.
3 http://www.reading.ac.uk/sse/about/News/sse-newsarticle-2008-05-16.asp retrieved 12 November
2008.
4 http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Jabberwacky retrieved 12 November 2008.
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don’t believe.’’ It was the usual, give-away, tiring, Eliza-ish strategy (Weizenbaum
1966), which we have now seen implemented for decades. Yet another confirma-
tion, if one was still needed, that while a dysfunctional pseudo-semantic behaviour
like Eliza’s or Parry’s could fool some human interlocutor in a highly specific
context, it is utterly unsuccessful in a general purpose, open conversation.
The second question did not change the situation, but merely confirmed the first
impression: ‘‘I have a jewellery box in my hand, how many CDs can I store in it?’’
Again, the human interlocutor provided some explanation, but the computer blew it
badly. More Eliza. The third question came at the end of the 5 min: ‘‘The four
capitals of the UK are three, Manchester and Liverpool. What’s wrong with this
sentence?’’ Once again, the computer went bananas.
All the other conversations developed rather similarly, although we (and
especially Mariarosaria Taddeo) posed a different range of questions, using
elementary logic (‘‘if London is south of Oxford, is Oxford north of London?’’),
common shortcuts (‘‘do u like to have dinner b4 u go to the cinema?’’), figures of
speech (‘‘how does the colour red smell?’’) and even simple, plain enumerations
(‘‘could you tell me three things that you could do with a telephone?’’). All these
questions immediately gave away both humans and machines, making it unnec-
essary for any further interaction or tests, such as connecting multiple questions,
‘‘remembering’’ previous answers, or revising previous statements on the basis of
new evidence.
If the TT at Reading went less badly than it could have (some machines did
manage to fool some judges a few times), this is probably because some of the
judges were asking useless questions, like ‘‘are you a computer?’’ or ‘‘do you
believe in God?’’ (these are real instances). This was a sign that two essential points
of the whole exercise had been missed by them (the judges, not the machines).
First, and especially given the very short interaction, answers should be as
informative as possible, which means that one should be able to maximise the
amount of useful evidence obtainable from the received message. It is the same rule
applied in the 20 questions game: each question must prompt an answer that can
make a very significant difference to your state of information, and the bigger the
difference the better. But in the examples above, either ‘‘yes’’ or ‘‘no’’ will leave
you absolutely unenlightened as to who your interlocutor is, so that is a wasted
bullet.
Second, questions must challenge the syntactic engine which is on the other side.
So other questions such as ‘‘what have you been up to today?’’ or ‘‘what do you do
for a living?’’ (again, two real examples) are rather useless too. The more a question
can be answered only if the interlocutor truly understands its meaning, context or
implications, the more that question has a chance of being a silver bullet.
Two documentaries by the BBC5 show both points been badly overseen by the
judges. But if all the judges had followed this simple ‘‘vademecum for a TT judge’’,
5 http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/technology/7666836.stm and http://www.bbc.co.uk/berkshire/content/articles/
2008/10/12/turing_test_feature.shtml both retrieved 12 November 2008.
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we suspect that their first question would have almost always been sufficient to
discriminate between the human and the machine. It certainly was for us.
Seven speakers took part in the parallel Symposium organised by Mark Bishop:
Margaret Boden, Selmer Bringsjord, Susan Greenfield, Andrew Hodges, Owen
Holland, Michael Wheeler and one of us (LF). Several participants defended the
view that a serious TT would have to last much longer than a handful of seconds.
We agreed, but we would also contend that this is as much because of the examined
agents, and the slow means of communication (you have to write/read everything on
a screen), as because of the judges, and their lack of training. If you need to test, and
we mean really test, an artefact, the higher the stakes are, the tougher the procedure
should be. We do not adopt the same standards when it comes to testing the safety of
a house’s central heating system or the safety of a nuclear power station. Why
(artificial) intelligent behaviour should be tested by the untrained, naı̈ve and often
uninformed ‘‘man in the street’’ remains a mystery to us, pace Turing’s suggestion.
Unless that is the sort of dude you wish to fool.
It might be that the Loebner Prize should be re-thought more like a chess
tournament, where we could play imitation games with different levels of time
control: long games (up to 7 h), short games (30/60 min), blitz games (3–15 min for
each player), bullet games (under 3 min) and one-question games (1 min). Almost all
the computers we tested could not even pass the latter. Our score for them was zero.
The AISB Symposium was meant to provide plenty of food for our natural
minds. We enjoyed the lively interactions, and found the presentations interesting
and informative. To give an example, Margaret Boden suggested in her talk that we
look at the TT from a different perspective. Her idea is to use it to assess the artistic
skills of machines instead of their natural language competences. The suggestion is
intriguing, and so were the examples of painting and music writing machines that
she described. While we have no problem in seeing how a painting or musical piece
(re)produced by those machines could easily be compared to a human artistic
artefact (we would recommend to the sceptic the extreme case represented by
Fontana’s famous series of cut-off paintings entitled ‘‘quanta’’), we are more
sceptical about the idea that such machines are indeed imitating human artistic skills
at all. We see a fundamental difference between them in terms of autonomy and
hence choice capabilities. A machine, or better its driving software, does not make
choices, it simply executes a set of instructions or, in the case of random operations,
it effectively tosses a coin to make its selection. When we avoid catchy metaphors,
computer programs that paint or output a score appear for what they are: very
complex high-tech versions of the old paint brush or goose quill. They are
instruments in the hand of the artist, not artists made by engineers. The problem is
the usual one and it affects not only supposedly ‘artistic’ machines but all software
programs that seem to exhibit some sort of intentional skill: their semantic
capabilities are in our eyes not in their codes.
We found the first half of Owen Holland’s talk about the Ratio Club particularly
inspiring. In his presentation, he recounted the story of this small, informal dining
club of young researchers (professors were explicitly banned) founded in 1949 (its
last meeting was in 1958). Some of the leading psychologists, physiologists,
mathematicians and engineers met over dinner to discuss issues in cybernetics.
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William Ross Ashby and Turing himself were among its members (Husbands and
Holland 2008).
We disagreed with several people, however, about the following issue, discussed
during the second half of Holland’s talk. There seemed to be some coalescing
consensus on the view that a machine will pass the TT only if it is conscious. This is
certainly not the case. The TT is a matter of semantics and understanding. Although
we might never be able to build truly intelligent machines––as we suspect––
consciousness need not play any role. This is not to say that a conscious machine
would not pass the TT. For it would, of course, insofar as consciousness
presupposes intelligence. Nor is it to say that smart applications will never be able to
deal successfully with semantic problems by intelligence-free means. Some already
do. Isn’t it handy that Google knows better and tells you that your keywords are
misspelled and should be so and so? But then, our dishwashers need no intelligence
(let alone consciousness) to do a better job than we. What it does mean is that, after
half a century of failures and more or less zero progress, some serious
reconsideration of the actual feasibility of true AI is a must, and making things
immensely more difficult can hardly help (although it might give some breathing
space to a dying paradigm). To our philosophical astonishment, however, the
argument seemed to be that, since we do not have the faintest idea about how to
build a machine that can answer a handful of intelligent questions or even win the
one-question TT consistently, the best strategy might be to go full-blown and try to
build a machine that is conscious. As if things were not already impossibly difficult
as they stand. This is like being told that if you cannot make something crawl, you
should make it run a hundred metres under 10 s, because then it will be able to
crawl. Surely it will, but surely there must be better ways of spending our research
funds than by chasing increasingly unrealistic dreams. The fact that nobody agrees
on what consciousness is can only help by mudding the water and making cheating
easier. After all, if anything may count as consciousness, the game becomes
somewhat easier. Turing, of course, knew better. He refused to define intelligence,
so we should follow his advice and perhaps adopt a test for consciousness. One of us
(Floridi 2005) has provided one in this journal, but others can be devised.
The day ended with the announcement that no machine had passed the TT. As
usual, there was a winner of the Loebner’s consolation prize for being the least
disappointing machine. This was the programme Elbot,6 created by Fred Roberts,
who was awarded the $3,000 Loebner Bronze Award. He managed to convince
three of the 12 interrogators that he was human. We agreed that it deserved the Prize
more than the others.
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